Abstract
The hypothesis of market discipline is empirically verified in the Central American banking system. A contrast is carried out on whether the riskier banks (the ones with the worst banking fundamentals) pay higher interest rates and receive smaller amounts in deposits. The generalized method of moments is used for dynamic panel data models (the SYS GMM estimator), as well as a sample of 30 banks from six Central American countries during the 2008–2012 period. Unlike the majority of the previous empirical literature, specifically for developed countries, no evidence of market discipline was found in Central America. The results are robust for several indicators of the banking fundamentals for purposes of internal demand of bank capital, and for other econometric models. These findings indicate weaknesses in the bank policy regarding the disclosure of information.© 2015, School of Accounting and Management, National Autonomous University of Mexico. All rights reserved. Publication of the article implies full assignment of property rights (copyright) in Journal of Accounting and Management. The publication mreserves the right to total or partial reproduction of the work in other print, electronic or any other alternative means, but always recognizing its responsibility.
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