Abstract
In this article, we analyze the mechanism design for the remuneration to the reduction of energy losses of a natural monopoly through a dynamic principal-agent model in continuous time. The objective of this research is to characterize the optimal regulation that induces reductions in electrical energy losses. In our methodology, we use a differential equation, its HJB representation, and an exponential utility function. The results suggest that the optimal contract is based on the agent's continuation value as a state variable. The article contributes to the analysis of control problems in conditions of incomplete information and incorporates information asymmetries and incentives in regulation. Among the future lines of research are the application of the model to specific energy markets and the empirical evaluation of the effectiveness of the proposed regulation.
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