The Ownership Family Like Control Mechanism of the Direction in the Mexican Companies: An empirical Evidence

Abstract

THE PRESENT WORK ANALYZES THE INTERACTION AMONG THE MECHANISMS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE "OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE, BOARD COMPOSITION AND LEVERAGE"; FOCUSING IN THE STUDY AND CONTROL OF THE DIRECTION. AFTER VERIFYING THAT THE OWNERSHIP FAMILY CONSTRAINING THE MANAGERS MANIPULATION ACCRUALS, THE EFFECT OF THE CONTROL MECHANISMS IS ANALYZED ON THE DISCRETIONARY ACCRUALS SEPARATING THE SAMPLE BY OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE "FAMILY AND NONFAMILY", FINDING THAT CONTROL MECHANISMS WHICH WERE IMPORTANT, STOPPED BEING BECAUSE ONE OF THEM, SPECIALLY THE STRUCTURE OF FAMILY OWNERSHIP, ALLEVIATES TO THE AGENCY PROBLEMS AVOIDING INCURRING ADDITIONAL CONTROL MECHANISMS LIKE THE DEBT. FOR THE ANALYSIS OF THE DATA WE LEFT FROM A STUDY OF CROSS SECTION WITH TWO MODELS, ONE THAT WE DENOMINATED GLOBAL WHERE THE STUDY IS MADE CONSIDERING THE SAMPLE OF JOINT FORM, AND ANOTHER ONE TO WHICH WE DENOMINATED INDIVIDUAL, IN WHICH WE MADE THE ANALYSIS DIVIDING THE SAMPLE IN FAMILY AND NONFAMILY FIRMS. FOR IT, WE HAVE USED A SET OF COMPANIES THAT HAVE QUOTED IN MEXICAN STOCK MARKET DURING 2003 AND 2004. AS VARIABLE REPRESENTATIVE OF MANAGERS MANIPULATION WE HAVE TAKEN THE DISCRETIONARY ACCRUALS OBTAINED FROM THE APPLICATION OF THE MODEL OF JONES IS ITS VERSION OF CROSS SECTION.